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Abstract. Voting can abstractly model any decision-making scenario
and as such it has been extensively studied over the decades. Recently,
the related literature has focused on quantifying the impact of utilizing
only limited information in the voting process on the societal welfare for
the outcome, by bounding the distortion of voting rules. Even though
there has been significant progress towards this goal, all previous works
have so far neglected the fact that in many scenarios (like presidential
elections) voting is actually a distributed procedure. In this paper, we
consider a setting in which the voters are partitioned into disjoint dis-
tricts and vote locally therein to elect local winning alternatives using a
voting rule; the final outcome is then chosen from the set of these alterna-
tives. We prove tight bounds on the distortion of well-known voting rules
for such distributed elections both from a worst-case perspective as well
as from a best-case one. Our results indicate that the partition of vot-
ers into districts leads to considerably higher distortion, a phenomenon
which we also experimentally showcase using real-world data.
Keywords: Distributed voting · District-based elections · Distortion
1 Introduction
In a decision-making scenario, the task is to aggregate the opinions of a group
of different people into a common decision. This process is often distributed,
in the sense that smaller groups first reach an agreement, and then the final
outcome is determined based on the options proposed by each such group. This
can be due to scalability issues (e.g., it is hard to coordinate a decision between
a very large number of participants), due to different roles of the groups (e.g.,
when each group represents a country in the European Union), or simply due to
established institutional procedures (e.g., electoral systems).
For example, in the US presidential elections, the voters in each of the 50
states cast their votes within their regional district, and each state declares a
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winner; the final winner is taken as the one that wins a weighted plurality vote
over the state winners, with the weight of each state being proportional to its
size. Another example is the Eurovision Song Contest, where each participating
country holds a local voting process (consisting of a committee vote and an
Internet vote from the people of the country) and then assigns points to the 10
most popular options, on a 1-12 scale (with 11 and 9 omitted). The winner of
the competition is the participant with the most total points.
The foundation of utilitarian economics, which originated near the end of the
18th century, revolves around the idea that the outcome of a decision making
process should be one that maximizes the well-being of the society, which is
typically captured by the notion of the social welfare. A fundamental question
that has been studied extensively in the related literature is whether the rules
that are being used for decision making actually achieve this goal, or to what
extend they fail to do so. This motivates the following question: What is the
effect of distributed decision making on the social welfare?
The importance of this investigation is highlighted by the example of the
2016 US presidential election [24]. While 48.2% of the US population (that par-
ticipated in the election) viewed Hillary Clinton as the best candidate, Donald
Trump won the election with only 46.1% of the popular vote. This was due to
the district-based electoral system, and the outcome would have been different
if there was a single pool of voters instead. A similar phenomenon occurred in
the 2000 presidential election as well, when Al Gore won the popular vote, but
George W. Bush was elected president.
1.1 Our Setting and Contribution
For concreteness, we use the terminology of voting as a proxy for any distributed
decision-making scenario. A set of voters are called to vote on a set of alternatives
through a district-based election. In other words, the set of voters is partitioned
into districts and each district holds a local election, following some voting rule.
The winners of the local elections are then aggregated into the single winner of
the general election. Note that this setting models many scenarios of interest,
such as those highlighted in the above discussion.
We are interested in the effect of the distributed nature of elections on the
social welfare of the voters (the sum of their valuations for the chosen outcome).
Typically, this effect is quantified by the notion of distortion [22], which is defined
as the worst-case ratio between the maximum social welfare for any outcome and
the social welfare for the outcome chosen through voting. Concretely, we are
interested in bounding the distortion of voting rules for district-based elections.
We consider three cases when it comes to the district partition: (a) symmetric
districts, in which every district has the same number of voters and contributes
the same weight to the final outcome, (b) unweighted districts, in which the
weight is still the same, but the sizes of the districts may vary, and (c) unrestricted
districts, where the sizes and the weights of the districts are unconstrained. For
each case, we show upper and lower bounds on the distortion of voting rules.
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First, in Section 3, we consider general voting rules (which might have access
to the numerical valuations of the voters) and provide distortion guarantees for
any voting rule as a function of the worst-case distortion of the voting rule
when applied to a single district. As a corollary, we obtain distortion bounds for
Range Voting, the rule that outputs a welfare-maximizing alternative, and prove
that it is optimal among all voting rules for the problem. Then, in Section 4, we
consider ordinal rules and provide a general lower bound on the distortion of any
such rule. For the widely-used Plurality voting rule, we provide tight distortion
bounds, proving that it is asymptotically the best ordinal voting rule in terms of
distortion. In Section 5, we provide experiments based on real data to evaluate
the distortion on “average case” and “average worst case” district partitions.
Finally, in Section 6, we explore whether districting (i.e., manually partitioning
the voters into districts in the best-way possible) can allow to recover the winner
of Plurality or Range Voting in the election without districts. We conclude with
possible avenues for future work in Section 7. Due to space constraints, most
proofs are omitted; see the full version of the paper [12].
1.2 Related Work
The distortion framework was first proposed by Procaccia and Rosenschein [22]
and subsequently it was adopted by a series of papers; for instance, see [1, 2, 4, 5,
7, 8, 13]. The original idea of the distortion measure was to quantify the loss in
performance due to the lack of information, meaning how well an ordinal voting
rule (i.e., one that has access only to the preference orderings induced by the
numerical values of the voters) can approximate the cardinal objective. In our
paper, the distortion will be attributed to two factors: always the fact that the
election is being done in districts, and possibly also the fact that the voting rules
employed are ordinal. Our setting follows closely that of Boutilier et al. [7] and
Caragiannis et al. [8], with the novelty of introducing district-based elections
and measuring their distortion. The worst-case distortion bounds of voting rules
in the absence of districts can be found in the aforementioned papers.
The ill effects of district-based elections have been highlighted in a series
of related articles, mainly revolving around the issue of gerrymandering [23],
i.e., the systematic manipulation of the geographical boundaries of an electoral
constituency in favor of a particular political party. The effects of gerrymandering
have been studied in the related literature before [6, 9, 19], but never in relation
to the induced distortion of the elections. While our district partitions are not
necessarily geographically-based, our worst-case bounds capture the potential
effects of gerrymandering on the deterioration of the social welfare. Other works
on district-based elections and distributed decision-making include [3, 10].
Related to our results in Section 6 is the paper by Lewenberg et al. [20],
which explores the effects of districting with respect to the winner of Plurality,
when ballot boxes are placed on the real plane, and voters are partitioned into
districts based on their nearest ballot box. The extra constraints imposed by the
geological nature of the districts in their setting leads to an NP-hardness result
for the districting problem, whereas for our unconstrained districts, making the
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Plurality winner the winner of the general election is always possible in polyno-
mial time. In contrast, the problem becomes NP-hard when we are interested in
the winner of Range Voting instead of Plurality.
2 Preliminaries
A general election E is defined as a tuple (M,N ,D,w,v, f), where
– M is a set of m alternatives;
– N is a set of n voters;
– D is a set of k ≥ 2 districts, with district d ∈ D containing nd voters such
that
∑
d∈D nd = n (i.e., the districts define a partition of the set of voters);
– w = (wd)d∈D is a weight-vector consisting of a weight wd ∈ R>0 for each
district d ∈ D;
– v = (v1, . . . ,vn) is a valuation profile for the n voters, where vi = (vij)j∈M
contains the valuation of voter i for all alternatives, and Vn is the set of all
such valuation profiles;
– f = (fd)d∈D is a set of voting rules (one for each district), where fd : Vnd →
M is a map of valuation profiles with nd voters to alternatives.
For each voter i ∈ N , we denote by d(i) the district she belongs to. For each
district d ∈ D, a local or district election between its members takes place, and
the winner of this election is the alternative jd = fd((vi)i:d(i)=d) that gets elected
according to fd. The outcome of the general election E is an alternative
j(E) ∈ arg max
j∈M
∑
d∈D
wd · 1 {jd = j} ,
where 1 {X} is equal to 1 if the event X is true, and 0 otherwise. In simple
words, the winner j(E) of the general election is the alternative with the highest
weighted approval score, breaking ties arbitrarily. For example, when all weights
are 1, j(E) is the alternative that wins the most local elections.
Following the standard convention, we adopt the unit-sum representation of
valuations, according to which
∑
j∈M vij = 1 for every voter i ∈ N . For a given
valuation profile v, the social welfare of alternative j ∈M is defined as the total
value the agents have for her:
SW(j|v) =
∑
i∈N
vij .
Throughout the paper, we assume that the same voting rule is applied in
every local election (possibly for a different number of voters though, depending
on how the districts are defined); we denote this voting rule by f and also let
f(v) be the alternative that is chosen by f when the voters have the valuation
profile v.
The distortion of a voting rule f in a local election with η voters is defined as
the worst-case ratio, over all possible valuation profiles of the voters participating
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in that election, between the maximum social welfare of any alternative and the
social welfare of the alternative chosen by the voting rule:
dist(f) = sup
v∈Vη
maxj∈M SW(j|v)
SW(f(v)|v) .
The distortion of a voting rule f in a general election is defined as the worst-case
ratio, over all possible general elections E that use f as the voting rule within
the districts, between the maximum social welfare of any alternative and the
social welfare of the alternative chosen by the general election:
gdist(f) = sup
E:f∈E
maxj∈M SW(j|v)
SW(j(E)|v) .
Again, in simple words, the distortion of a voting rule f is the worst-case over
all the possible valuations that voters can have and over all possible ways of
partitioning these voters into districts. When k = 1, we recover the standard
definition of the distortion.
Next, we define some standard properties of voting rules.
Definition 1 (Properties of voting rules). A voting rule f is
– ordinal, if the outcome only depends on the preference orderings induced
by the valuations and not the actual numerical values themselves. Formally,
given a valuation profile v, let Πv be the ordinal preference profile formed
by the values of the agents for the alternatives (assuming some fixed tie-
breaking rule). A voting rule is ordinal if for any two valuation profiles v
and v′ such that Πv = Πv′ , it holds that f(v) = f(v′).
– unanimous, if whenever all agents agree on an alternative, that alternative
gets elected. Formally, whenever there exists an alternative a ∈M for whom
via ≥ vij for all voters i ∈ N and all alternatives j ∈M, then f(v) = a.
– (strictly) Pareto efficient, if whenever all agents agree that an alternative a
is better than b, then b cannot be elected. Formally, if via > vib for all i ∈ N ,
then f(v) 6= b.4
Remark. It is not hard to see that we can assume that the best voting rule in
terms of distortion is Pareto efficient, without loss of generality. Indeed, for any
voting rule f that is not Pareto efficient, we can construct the following Pareto
efficient rule f ′: for every input on which f outputs a Pareto efficient alternative,
f ′ outputs the same alternative; for every input on which f outputs an alter-
native that is not Pareto efficient, f ′ outputs a maximal Pareto improvement,
that is, a Pareto efficient alternative which all voters (weakly) prefer more than
the alternative chosen by f . Clearly, f ′ is Pareto efficient and achieves a social
4 Pareto efficiency usually requires that there is no other alternative who all voters
weakly prefer and who one voter strictly prefers. We use the strict definition in our
proofs, as it is also without loss of generality with respect to distortion.
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welfare at least as high as f . Note also that Pareto efficiency implies unanimity.
In our proofs, we will use both of these properties without loss of generality.
Finally, most of the voting rules that are being employed in practice are ordinal,
with the notable exception of Range Voting, which is the voting rule that out-
puts the alternative that maximizes the social welfare.
We consider the following three basic cases for the general elections, depend-
ing on the size and the weight of the districts:
– Symmetric Elections: all districts consist of n/k voters and have the same
weight, i.e., nd = n/k and wd = 1 for each d ∈ D.
– Unweighted Elections: all districts have the same weight, but not necessarily
the same number of voters, i.e., wd = 1 for each d ∈ D.
– Unrestricted Elections: there are no restrictions on the sizes and weights of
the districts.
Of course, the class of symmetric elections is a subclass of that of unweighted
elections which in turn is a subclass of the class of unrestricted elections.
3 The Effect of Districts for General Voting Rules
Our aim in this section is to showcase the immediate effect of using districts
to distributively aggregate votes. To this end, we present tight bounds on the
distortion of all voting rules in a general election. We will first state a general
theorem relating the distortion gdist(f) of any general election that uses a
voting rule f for the local elections, with the distortion dist(f) of the voting
rule.
Theorem 1. Let f be a voting rule with dist(f) = γ. Then, the distortion
gdist(f) of f in the general election is at most
(i) γ + γmk2 for symmetric elections;
(ii) γ + γm2
(
n+maxd∈D nd
mind∈D nd
− 1
)
for unweighted elections;
(iii) γ + γm
(
n
mind∈D nd
− 1
)
for unrestricted elections.
We now turn to concrete voting rules and consider perhaps the most natural
such rule: Range Voting (RV).
Definition 2 (Range Voting (RV)). Given a valuation profile v = (v1, ...,vη)
with η voters, Range Voting elects the alternative that maximizes the social wel-
fare of the voters.
Note that the rule is both unanimous and Pareto efficient. Immediately from the
definition of the rule and Theorem 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The distortion gdist(RV) of RV in the general election is at most
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(i) 1 + mk2 for symmetric elections;
(ii) 1 + m2
(
n+maxd∈D nd
mind∈D nd
− 1
)
for unweighted elections;
(iii) 1 +m
(
n
mind∈D nd
− 1
)
for unrestricted elections.
We continue by presenting matching lower bounds on the distortion of any
voting rule in a general election. The high-level idea in the proof of the following
theorem is that the election winner is chosen arbitrarily among the alternatives
with equal weight, which might lead to the cardinal information within the
districts to be lost.
Theorem 2. The distortion of all voting rules in a general election is at least
(i) 1 + mk2 for symmetric elections;
(ii) 1 + m2
(
n+maxd∈D nd
mind∈D nd
− 1
)
for unweighted elections;
(iii) 1 +m
(
n
mind∈D nd
− 1
)
for unrestricted elections.
4 Ordinal Voting Rules and Plurality
Although Range Voting is quite natural, its documented drawback is that it
requires a very detailed informational structure from the voters, making the
elicitation process rather complicated. For this reason, most voting rules that
have been applied in practice are ordinal (see Definition 1), as such rules present
the voters with the much less demanding task of reporting a preference ordering
over the alternatives, rather than actual numerical values.
Thus, a very meaningful question, from a practical point of view, is “What
is the distortion of ordinal voting rules?” The most widely used such rule is
Plurality Voting. Besides its simplicity, the importance of this voting rule also
comes from the fact that it is used extensively in practice. For instance, it is
used in presidential elections in a number of countries like the USA and the UK.
Definition 3 (Plurality Voting (PV)). Given a valuation profile v and its
induced ordinal preference profile Πv, PV elects the alternative with the most
first position appearances in Πv, breaking ties arbitrarily.
It is known that the distortion dist(PV) of Plurality Voting is O(m2) [8]. There-
fore, if we plug-in this number to our general bound in Theorem 1, we obtain
corresponding upper bounds for PV. However, in the following we obtain much
better bounds, taking advantage of the structure of the mechanism; these bounds
are actually tight.
Theorem 3. The distortion gdist(PV) of PV is exactly
(i) 1 + 3m
2k
4 for symmetric elections;
(ii) 1 + m
2
4
(
3n+maxd∈D nd
mind∈D nd
− 1
)
for unweighted elections;
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(iii) 1 +m2
(
n
mind∈D nd
− 12
)
, for unrestricted elections.
Proof. We prove only the upper bounds for the first two parts here; the upper
bound for the third part as well as the matching lower bounds can be found in
the full version.
Consider a general unweighted election E with a set M of m alternatives, a
set N of n voters, a set D of k districts such that each district d consists of nd
voters and has weight wd = 1. Let v be the valuation profile consisting of the
valuations of all voters for all alternatives, which induces the ordinal preference
profile Πv. To simplify our discussion, let Nd(j) be the set of voters in district
d that rank alternative j in the first position, and also set |Nd(j)| = nd(j).
Let a = j(E) be the winner of the election and denote by A ⊆ D the set of
districts in which a wins according to PV. Then, we have that
SW(a|v) =
∑
i∈N
via ≥
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via. (1)
Since a has the plurality of votes in each district d ∈ A, we have that nd(a) ≥
nd(j) for every j ∈ M, and by the fact that
∑
j∈M nd(j) = nd, we obtain that
nd(a) ≥ ndm . Similarly, for each agent i ∈ Nd(a) we have that via ≥ vij for every
j ∈M, and by the unit-sum assumption, we obtain that via ≥ 1m . We also have
that
∑
d∈A nd ≥ |A| ·mind∈D nd. Hence,∑
i:d(i)∈A
via ≥
∑
d∈A
∑
i∈Nd(a)
via ≥ 1
m
·
∑
d∈A
nd(a)
≥ 1
m2
∑
d∈A
nd ≥ 1
m2
· |A| ·min
d∈D
nd. (2)
Let b the optimal alternative, and denote by B ⊂ D the set of districts in
which b is the winner. We split the social welfare of b into three parts:
SW(b|v) =
∑
i:d(i)∈A
vib +
∑
i:d(i)∈B
vib +
∑
i:d(i) 6∈A∪B
vib. (3)
We will now bound each term individually. First consider a district d ∈ A. Then,
the welfare of the agents in d for b can be written as∑
i:d(i)=d
vib =
∑
i∈Nd(a)
vib +
∑
i∈Nd(b)
vib +
∑
i 6∈Nd(a)∪Nd(b)
vib.
Since a is the favourite alternative of every agent i ∈ Nd(a), vib ≤ via. By
definition, the value of every agent i ∈ Nd(b) for b is at most 1. The value
of every agent i 6∈ Nd(a) ∪ Nd(b) for b can be at most 1/2 since otherwise b
would definitely be the favourite alternative of such an agent. Combining these
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observations, we get∑
i:d(i)=d
vib ≤
∑
i∈Nd(a)
via + nd(b) +
1
2
∑
j 6=a,b
nd(j)
≤
∑
i:d(i)=d
via +
1
2
nd(b) +
1
2
∑
j 6=a
nd(j)
≤
∑
i:d(i)=d
via +
1
2
nd(a) +
1
2
(
nd − nd(a)
)
=
∑
i:d(i)=d
via +
1
2
nd,
where the second inequality follows by considering the value of all agent in d
for alternative a, while the third inequality follows by the fact that a wins b by
plurality. By summing over all districts in A, we can bound the first term of (3)
as follows: ∑
i:d(i)∈A
vib ≤
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
1
2
∑
d∈A
nd. (4)
For the second term of (3), by definition we have that the value of each agent
in the districts of B for alternative b can be at most 1, and therefore∑
i:d(i)∈B
vib ≤
∑
d∈B
nd.
For the third term of (3), observe that the total value of the agents in a district
d 6∈ A ∪ B for b must be at most 34nd; otherwise b would necessarily be ranked
first in strictly more than half of the agents’ preferences and therefore win in the
district. Hence, ∑
i:d(i)6∈A∪B
vib ≤ 3
4
∑
d 6∈A∪B
nd.
By substituting the bounds for the three terms of (3), as well as by taking into
account the facts that |B| ≤ |A| and |A| ≥ 1, we can finally upper-bound the
social welfare of b as follows:
SW(b|v) ≤
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
1
2
∑
d∈A
nd +
∑
d∈B
nd +
3
4
∑
d6∈A∪B
nd
=
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
1
4
(
3n+
∑
d∈B
nd −
∑
d∈A
nd
)
≤
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
1
4
(
3n+ |B| ·max
d∈D
nd − |A| ·min
d∈D
nd
)
≤
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
1
4
· |A| ·
(
3n+ max
d∈D
nd −min
d∈D
nd
)
(5)
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By (1), (2) and (5), we can upper-bound the distortion of PV as follows:
gdist(PV) =
SW(b|v)
SW(a|v)
≤
∑
i:d(i)∈A via +
1
4 · |A| · (3n+ maxd∈D nd −mind∈D nd)∑
i:d(i)∈A via
≤ 1 + m
2
4
(
3n+ maxd∈D nd
mind∈D nd
− 1
)
.
This completed the proof of part (ii). For part (i), we get the desired bound of
1 + 3m
2k
4 by simply setting mind∈D nd = maxd∈D nd = n/k. uunionsq
Our next theorem shows that PV is asymptotically the best possible voting
rule among all deterministic ordinal voting rules.
Theorem 4. The distortion gdist(f) of any ordinal Pareto efficient voting rule
f is
(i) Ω(m2k), for symmetric elections;
(ii) Ω
(
m2 n+maxd∈D ndmind∈D nd
)
, for unweighted elections;
(iii) Ω
(
m2n
mind∈D nd
)
, for unrestricted elections.
5 Experiments
Thus far, we have studied the worst-case effect of the partition of voters into
districts on the distortion of voting rules. In this section, we further showcase this
phenomenon experimentally by using real-world utility profiles that are drawn
from the Jester dataset [16], which consists of ratings of 100 different jokes in the
interval [−10, 10] by approximately 70,000 users; this dataset has been used in
a plethora of previous papers, including the seminal work of Boutilier et al. [7].
Following their methodology, we build instances with a set of alternatives that
consists of the eight most-rated jokes. For various values of k, we execute 1000
independent simulations as follows: we select a random set of 100 users among
the ones that evaluated all eight alternatives, rescale their ratings so that they
are non-negative and satisfy the unit-sum assumption, and then divide them
into k districts.
For the partition into districts, we consider both random partitions as well
as bad partitions in terms of distortion. For the construction of the latter, for
each instance consisting of a specific value of k and a set of voters, we create
100 random partitions of the voters into k districts, simulate the general elec-
tion (based on the voting rules we consider) and then keep the partition with
maximum distortion.
We compare the average distortion of four rules: Range Voting, Plurality,
Borda, and Harmonic. Borda and Harmonic are two well-known positional scor-
ing rules defined by the scoring vectors (m−1,m−2, ..., 0) and (1, 1/2, ..., 1/m),
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Fig. 1: Average distortion from 1000 simulations as a function of the number of
districts k with random partitions of voters into districts.
Table 1: Average distortion from 1000 simulations with bad partitions of voters
into districts.
unweighted weighted
k 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Range Voting 1 4.82 4.51 4.50 4.60 1 4.46 4.96 5.14 5.14
Plurality 1.05 5.03 4.66 4.71 4.81 1.05 4.77 5.29 5.47 5.49
Borda 1.01 4.83 4.47 4.50 4.61 1.01 4.51 4.98 5.16 5.18
Harmonic 1.02 4.97 4.60 4.62 4.72 1.02 4.64 5.16 5.35 5.36
respectively. According to these rules, each voter assigns points to the alterna-
tives based on the positions she ranks them, and the alternative with the most
points is the winner; Plurality can also be defined similarly by the scoring vector
(1, 0, ..., 0).
Figure 1 depicts the results of our simulations for unweighted and weighted
districts when the partition into districts is random and k ∈ {1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25};
for weighted districts, the weights are drawn uniformly at random from a given
interval. As one can observe, the behaviour of the four voting rules is very similar
in both cases, and it is evident that as the number of districts increases, the
distortion increases as well. For instance, the distortion of Plurality increased by
3.71% for k = 5 compared to k = 1 (i.e., when there are no districts) and by
6.44% for k = 25; these values are similar for the other rules as well, although
a bit lower. Table 1 contains the results of our simulations for unweighted and
weighted districts when the partition into districts is bad (in terms of distortion)
and k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. As in the case of random districts, we can again observe
that the distortion increases as k increases, but now the difference between the
cases with districts (k ≥ 2) and without districts (k = 1) is more clear; the
distortion is almost five times higher.
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6 Best-case Partitions via Districting
In this section we turn out attention to a somewhat different setting. We assume
that the k districts are not a priori defined, and instead we are free to decide
the partition of the voters into the districts so as to minimize their effect on the
distortion of the underlying voting rule; we refer to the process of partitioning
the voters into k districts as k-districting. We consider symmetric districts, and
start our analysis with the question of whether it is possible to define the districts
so that the optimal alternative (i.e., the one that maximizes the social welfare
of the voters) wins the general election when RV is used as the voting rule.
Unfortunately, as we show with our next theorem, this is not always possible.
Theorem 5. For every k ≥ 2, there exists an instance such that no symmetric
k-districting allows the optimal alternative to win the general election when RV
is the voting rule.
Proof. Consider a general election with n + 1 alternatives M = {a1, ..., an, b}
and let k be such that n/k is an integer for simplicity; then, each district must
consist of exactly n/k voters. Let ε ∈
(
0, 12(n+1)
)
and let v be the valuation
profile according to which voter i has value nn+k + ε for alternative ai and value
k
n+k − ε for alternative b; her value for the remaining alternatives is zero.
Since SW(ai|v) = nn+k + ε for every i ∈ [n] and SW(b|v) = nkn+k − nε,
alternative b is clearly the optimal alternative. However, observe that all possible
sets of n/k voters that can be included together in a district cannot make b the
winner of the district when the voting rule is RV. Indeed, the welfare of such a
set of voters for b is only nn+k − nεk , while their welfare for the alternatives they
rank first is nn+k . Therefore, there is no symmetric k-districting that can make
b the winner of the general election with RV. uunionsq
In fact, the instance used in the above proof indicates that even the best-case
distortion of RV may be at least k. We continue the bad news by showing that
the problem of deciding whether it is possible to define the districts such that
the optimal alternative wins the general election with RV is NP-hard for k = 2.
Theorem 6. Deciding whether there is a symmetric 2-districting such that the
optimal alternative is the winner of the general election with RV is NP-hard.
In contrast to the above result for the optimal alternative and RV, we next
show that we can always find a symmetric k-districting so that the PV winner
without districts can be made the winner of the general election when PV is used
as the voting rule within the districts. Since the voting rule is PV, we assume
that the only knowledge which we can leverage in order to define the districts is
about the favourite alternatives of the voters (i.e., for each voter, we know the
alternative she approves).
Theorem 7. For any k ≥ 2, there always exists a symmetric k-districting that
allows the winner of PV without districts to win the general election with k
districts, and this districting can be computed in polynomial time.
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We conclude this section by showing that the above result for PV is essentially
tight. This follows by the existence of instances where any partition of the voters
into any number of districts yields distortion for the general election with PV
that is asymptotically equal to the distortion of PV without districts.
Theorem 8. There exist instances where any symmetric districting yields dis-
tortion gdist(PV) = Ω(m2).
7 Conclusion and Possible Extensions
In this paper, we have initiated the study of the distortion of distributed voting.
We showcased the effect of districting on the social welfare both theoretically
from a worst- and a best-case perspective, as well as experimentally using real-
world data. Even though we have painted an almost complete picture, our work
reveals many interesting avenues for future research.
In terms of our results, possibly the most obvious open question is whether
we can strengthen the weak intractability result of Theorem 6 using a reduction
from a strongly NP-hard problem, and also extend it to k ≥ 2. Moving away from
the unconstrained normalized setting that we considered here, it would be very
interesting to analyze the effect of districts in the case of metric preferences [1],
a setting that has received considerable attention in the recent related literature
on the distortion of voting rules without districts [2, 11, 14, 15, 17, 21]. Other
important extensions include settings in which the partitioning of voters into
districts is further constrained by natural factors such as geological locations [20]
or connectivity in social networks [18].
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